I. Introduction
Network Industries are lines of business in which a significant amount of the consumer's utility is derived from network externalities. 2 Network externalities are the phenomenon in which consumers of a good or service gain more utility from it as the number of other people that consume that good or service increases. 3 Simply put, network industries are businesses that exhibit 'demand economies of scale' -The higher the satisfied demand, the greater the utility from each unit supplied. 4 The credit card industry is a network industry. 5 It has two 'customers' 6 -consumers (who pay for their transactions with credit cards) 7 and merchants (who are guaranteed to receive payments made to them by credit cards): The more merchants join the network (by accepting a certain brand of credit card), the greater the utility to the consumer holding a card of that brand (since the card is useful in more establishments); The more consumers join the network (by being issued a certain brand of credit card), the greater the utility to the merchant accepting cards of that brand (because the benefit of guaranteed payments can apply to more transactions).
Since the utility to a consumer is greater the larger the network, one would expect, other things equal, that once a network is larger than its rivals, all consumers would join the larger network, and that network would become a monopoly. 8 Other things are not always equal, though. Consumers may find certain benefits of a smaller network outweigh the lesser benefits derived from its size. The balance depends on the degree of product differentiation as well as the magnitude of the network externalities.
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Competition between networks is not the only form of competition possible in a network industry. If the customers of competing systems 10 can transact with each other without from the lower production costs), but their utility from the product is not affected by the number of other consumers of the product. A useful test to determine if certain economies of scale are network externalities is to determine whether those economies of scale would exist if the same amount of the product was produced by a larger number of producers. Since network externalities are concerned with the scale of demand, they are unaffected by splitting production between several firms (as long as all the products can interconnect with each other). But supply-side economies of scale depend on production by a single firm, and therefore are decreased by such a split. 5 We will used the term 'credit card' broadly, to include not only credit cards but also charge cards, debit cards, and similar products. Since we focus on the network aspects of the industry, not the financial ones, the financing aspect of the cards will be of relatively little importance in this paper. 6 For discussions on the benefits of consumers and merchants from credit cards, see: S. 10 We shall use the term 'system' to regard the mechanisms of exchange governed by a single firm, while a 'network' may include any number of systems (including a single system), in which the cost of intersystem transactions is not significantly different than the cost of intrasystem transactions of a similar type.
incurring a cost significantly greater than that when transacting with other customers of their system, then customers of both systems enjoy the greater network externalities derived from the combined number of customers. When the cost of intersystem transactions is not significantly different than that of intrasystem transactions (for transactions of a similar type), the two systems are compatible, and are in fact part of one larger network.
The credit card industry exhibits both inter-network and intra-network competition. 11 For example, several credit card companies may compete in issuing Visa brand credit cards (intra-network competition within the Visa network), while they also compete with companies offering Master Card brand credit cards (inter-network competition). 12 This is most likely due to the fact that credit cards offer benefits other than those related to network size, and also due to the degree of non-exclusivity in consumption of credit cards (while any given transaction is usually made with a single credit card, many consumers have more than one credit card, and many merchants accept more than one brand of credit cards).
The creation of compatibility is at the heart of a multi-system network. Since in internetwork competition the competitors usually have differently sized networks, they unevenly benefit from network externalities. As long as the networks are not connected, the larger network has an advantage in such competition, both by capturing some of the added value its larger network confers on consumers, and, indirectly, by squeezing the smaller networks out of the market and benefiting from the added market power. 13 ' 14 11 There are differences in the structure of credit card industries between countries. For example, in the Israeli credit card industry, before 1998, there was very little intra-network competition. We will explore the difference between the Israeli and U.S. credit card industries infra, in Parts II(2) and II(3). 12 Issuing credit cards is but one aspect of competition in the credit card industry. We will see other aspects of competition when we survey the structure of the industry, infra in Part II(1). 13 We must be careful not to stumble into the fallacy of double counting, though. A firm can't at the same time extract the maximal profit out of a competitive advantage that is has and use that competitive advantage to harm its competitors. It could strike a balance between the two, putting its advantage to use in extracting some profits and deterring or harming competitors to a certain degree. 14 Where networks are not interconnected, the existence of a large network serves as an entry barrier, augmenting the large network's market power. See Drew Fundenberg & Jean Tirole, Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry, 48 J. Indus. Econ. 373 (2000) (The installed base of a user can serve a preemptive function on an entrant if the entrant's good is incompatible with the incumbent's good and there are network externalities in demand).
This will sometimes make the larger system reluctant to facilitate compatibility between its system and other systems. Where the larger system must interconnect with others (e.g., due to a legal requirement or where some degree of interconnection is inevitable), it might engage in a strategy of degrading the connectivity.
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Foreseeing this, interconnection agreements may include incentives for the larger system to interconnect efficiently with other members of the network (for example, by compensating the larger system for the greater value its system confers to the network).
However, such mechanisms to reallocate the 'pie' are limited to the extent the interconnection agreement enlarges that 'pie'. When a larger system is likely to, or already is holding significant market power, an interconnection agreement will hinder its exercising of that market power (as it would now require coordination with the other systems in the network). The loss of monopoly profits causes the two firms' collective 'pie' to shrink (though it enlarges society's pie by eliminating the dead weight loss).
When such losses of market power are greater than the benefits from network externalities of the now larger network, 16 the systems' pie shrinks and no mechanism can entirely compensate the larger system. In such cases, the larger system is very likely to resist facilitating compatibility. This paper observes difficulties and possible solutions to facilitating compatibility between systems; that is, in causing two (or more) firms to operate on the same network.
Specifically, the paper examines government's role in introducing competition into a network industry. In Part II, we explain the structure and operation of the credit card industry in general. 19 We then briefly survey one such industry structure -the American credit card industry
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-that serves as a benchmark to which we compare the structure of the Israeli credit card industry. 21 We find that there are striking differences between the two, and suggest that these differences are explained by the different structure of the consumer banking industry in either country.
After examining the market structure, we proceed to examine the chronology of events that led to the entry of a second credit card firm into the Israeli Visa network. 22 As we have mentioned above, in some cases resistance to interconnection may result from an attempt to maintain monopolistic rents. In such cases, the parties to the interconnection negotiation may not reach an agreement, even though from society's standpoint such an agreement would be welfare enhancing. This may justify government intervention in facilitating interconnection. We examine some of the options for intervention that were open to the Israeli Antitrust Authority. 23 We then focus on key issues in the interconnection agreement: The setting of interchange fees and coordination in the operation of the network. 24 The entry of a second system into the Israeli Visa network led to striking effects on the structure of the Israeli credit card industry. We therefore conclude with a brief review of the aftermath of the interconnection agreement, so much as can be observed at this recent stage. another survey found that 83 percent of retailers felt that accepting credit cards increased sales and 58% thought their profits would increase by accepting credit cards. 30 We will now examine the important traits of the payment system, that cause it to be so valuable as to gain ground over less expensive competing systems. 26 As we said above, the term 'credit card' includes charge cards and other cards that do not enable medium or long term financing. Therefore, we ignore a characteristic that is very important in credit cards, but not debit or charge cards -the credit card as a method of financing. We instead limit our discussion to the credit card as a payment system. As we will see, in Israel credit cards are used primarily for their payment functions, not their financial functions. Payment systems enable a party to a transaction to provide value regardless of the specific needs of the other party. 31 Therefore, the first important trait of the credit card industry is that it enables a consumer to provide generic value, equivalent to cash, in a transaction with a merchant.
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In ancient payment systems, the value was inherent in the currency used (e.g., gold coins conferred value equal to the actual value of the gold in them). Such systems are wasteful.
The intrinsic value of the currency is the value of its alternative use; using 'expensive' currency (of high intrinsic, not necessarily nominal, value) for payment prevents it from being utilized for another use. By replacing the expensive currency with currency that is less expensive (because it has lower valued alternative uses), the expensive currency would be freed to its alternative uses.
A low (intrinsic) value currency system will be pareto superior to a high value system only if the shift to low value currency would not undermine the value at which the currency is accepted. For example, suppose an ounce of gold is worth one dollar, and an ounce of copper -five cents. A golden dollar was a coin made of one ounce of gold.
After shifting to a low intrinsic value system, the new dollar is made of an ounce of copper. If the copper dollar is accepted in transactions for merely 5 cents, nothing was gained -the payment system still freezes assets of the same utility as their monetary value.
For the payment system to be efficient, currency should trade on par -that is its nominal value -regardless of its intrinsic value. To trade on par, people accepting the currency must be guaranteed that they will receive the par value of the currency when disposing of it. Intrinsic value was one such guarantee. Legal tender offers a similar guarantee by the government issuing the notes. Credit cards provide a similar guarantee by the credit card company, to pay to a merchant the value agreed on (between the consumer and the merchant) in the base transaction. That is the second important trait of credit card systems.
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A third trait of the credit card industry -though it is not common to all credit cards -is its extensive use of the network structure. Many credit card networks separate between the dealing with consumers (assessing their financial condition, deciding the line of credit, interest rate, etc., issuing the cards and collecting payments) and dealing with the merchants (guaranteeing payment to the merchant, transferring the money to it, providing mechanisms to lessen fraud, etc.). Therefore, several different companies may do either of these functions, or both, and in many transactions different credit card companies will deal with the consumer and the merchant.
By now one can see that there are four 'roles' to play in a credit card transaction. The first two are the parties to the base transaction -the consumer and the merchant. The third is the credit card company that had issued the credit card with which the purchase was made, and that deals with the consumer in all credit card matters -the issuer. The fourth role is that of the credit card company that deals with the merchant (enlists it into the network, guarantees and processes the payments the merchant is due) -the acquirer.
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One person can play several of the four roles. In some transactions, the issuer and the acquirer are the same entity. Sometimes the issuer is also the merchant (an acquirer is not needed then), as is the case with retailer cards, which are often issued by department stores, supermarket or gas chains, etc. Theoretically, the acquirer could be the consumer, but such transactions make little sense, since the acquirer is the guarantor to the consumer's promise to pay. Similarly, there is no sense in the consumer and the merchant being the same person, since there is then no real exchange of value.
Let us examine the process of a credit card transaction. It all begins with the base transaction. For example, consumer buys from merchant a watch at a price of $100.
Consumer pays with a credit card, so in return for the watch, consumer signs a credit card IOU for $100. We can then trace, in the diagram below, 35 either the movement of the money (inner circle; moves counter-clockwise) or the movement of the IOU (outer circle, moves clockwise): The merchant presents the IOU to the acquirer, who pays $100 to the merchant (after deducting a merchant fee -in our example 3% -for providing facilitating the credit card purchase). The acquirer then presents the IOU to the Issuer, who pays the acquirer $100, and finally the issuer presents the IOU to (or simply bills) the consumer for $100.
Credit card IOU for $100
Pay $100; subject to chargeback
Two issues are worth elaborating on, regarding the Issuer-Acquirer relationship. Firstthe issuer is responsible for collection from the consumer, and therefore in effect guarantees to the Acquirer the consumer's IOU (while the acquirer guarantees the same to the merchant). The issuer must be compensated for both operating costs and the risk of guaranteeing (to the Acquirer) the consumer's transactions. The compensation is in the form of an interchange fee, generally a certain percentage of the value of transactions in which a credit card issued by the issuer was used. In our example, this rate is 2%. We will later discuss interchange fees in depth.
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A second point regards chargebacks. Since the issuer guarantees the consumer's payments, and has better knowledge of the consumer's financial situation than the acquirer or the business, the issuer may set certain conditions to the use of the credit card, and require that the acquirer and merchant abide by them. A common condition is requiring individual authorization for each transaction above a certain amount. For example, requiring that the merchant call by phone or authorize on line with the issuer any credit card purchase of above $250. If the conditions were not followed, the issuer may chargeback (in effect, refuse to pay) the amount set in the IOU. The acquirer will then usually refuse to honor the IOU presented by the merchant who failed to follow the conditions. Chargebacks will be discussed below, when examining various issues operational issues in the interconnection agreement.
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We will now briefly survey the credit card industry in the United States, and then compare it to the subject of our case study -the Israeli credit card industry. Ausubel, who considers only issuers of bank cards (Visa and MasterCard) finds that in 1987, the top ten issuers had a market share of 43.4% of outstanding balances, while the second ten had an additional 9.6%. Measuring market share by number of accounts results in an even more egalitarian result -30% of the accounts held by the top ten, and another 9.7% held by the second ten. We will now proceed to examine a far more concentrated credit card industry -and the subject of our case study -the Israeli credit card industry.
The Israeli Credit Card Industry
Two networks controlled the Israeli credit card industry until 1998. One, Isracard Ltd. has joined the Visa international network. 52 The Economist, supra note 50. 53 We will see the close relationship between concentration in the banking and credit card industries when we examine the Israeli credit card industry, infra, in Part II(3 Two other international credit card networks entered the Israeli market significantly later (in the 1990s), but did not change the competitive balance. Diner's club had merged into ICC, and the American Express franchise was awarded to an affiliate of Isracard.
Therefore, the Israeli market continued to accommodate only two competitors, each offering two credit card brands.
In 1996, ICC's market share has been estimated at 55%, and Isracard's at -45%.
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Among the four networks (in 1997), Visa's share has been estimated at about 49%,
Isracard/MasterCard at 44%, Diner's Club at 4%, and American Express at 3%.
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Credit cards are very popular as a payment system in Israel. In 1996, the industry transaction volume was estimated at 43 billion NIS (New Israeli Shekels). 59 71% of the Israeli population has been issued a credit card. 60 Credit cards are used in about 32% of household consumption purchases, and is more popular than personal checks (55% of the non-cash purchases are done with a credit card, while most of the remaining non-cash purchases are done with checks). 61 The average annual transaction volume per card in MasterCard/Isracard and American Express), card holders will usually hold at most two credit cards, and more often just one -either a Visa or a MasterCard).
There are exceptions to this. First, the bank is usually able to issue a credit card of the rival network to preferred clients who insist on receiving that card brand. This is rarely requested, though, since it is extremely rare that an Israeli merchant accepts MasterCard but not Visa, or vice versa. Second, any consumer may open an account at another bank and order there a credit card of the other network. This too is rarely done, since it is usually cumbersome to manage two active bank accounts, and, as said above, the added benefit from a second credit card is not perceived as very large.
A third exception regards clients of banks other than the three that have stakes in credit card companies. Some of these banks market exclusively credit cards of one company, while others offer their clients a choice between cards. This might have caused a breakdown of the 'segregation' in the credit card industry, if the remaining banks had a significant market share in the banking industry. They do not. 64 According to one estimate, 18% of Israeli cardholders have more than one card in 1996. "The Battle of Plastic Cards", Banka'ut, Volume 9, September 1996. This statistic may even exaggerate the actual use of a second card, as often only one of the cards was linked to the active bank account, while the other was rarely used.
The Israeli banking sector is extremely concentrated. In This may not be surprising when one takes into account that credit cards serve as merely another product of the banks'. With the control they wield over the credit card industry, 65 One type of deferred payment that is commonly taken advantage of is interest-free installment payments. These are not features of the credit card, though, but rather are offered by the merchant, and it is the merchant who bears the waiver of interest (the credit card company merely facilitates the merchant's special terms).
they can prevent the financial function of credit cards from cannibalizing their financial operations. A bank that would allow it's credit card to offer an interest rate that is lower than the interest rate it charges for overdraft or lines of credit will forego potential profits.
Such a system would not be possible if there was a threat that another credit card company would offer the bank's client a card with lower interest rates (in that case, the client's bank will have to lower either the credit card's or the line of credit's interest rate to face competition from the other credit card company). But the segregated market insulates each bank from such competition, and therefore makes it profitable for them to price credit card financing in a way that effectively strips credit cards of most of their financial function, leaving it to function almost exclusively as a payment system.
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One must not neglect to notice the advantages of the close connection between the banking and credit card industries. Banks are in good position to assess and monitor their clients' financial situation, and do it regardless of whether they issue a credit card to their client or not (thus, they utilize what has been a cost sunk into their banking operations).
Further, credit card companies in Israel collect directly from the cardholder's bank account (in a similar fashion to debit cards in the U.S., though collection is done once per month for all charges incurred during that month; the lag between transaction and collection is the equivalent to the 'grace period' given by credit cards in the U.S). This reduces the costs of collection and reduces further the risk of cardholder default.
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Regardless of whether the benefits of a segregated credit card market outweigh its demerits, that market structure persisted in the Israeli credit card market for decades. The large market share of the three banks owning the two credit card companies has afforded stability to that structure, as mutual deterrence prevented the credit card companies from preying on it's rival's clients, and smaller banks could not amass the client base needed to 66 Competition over the financial functions of credit cards is not free of flaws in the U.S. as well. See Ausubel, supra note 39. 67 It is noteworthy that the Israeli credit card industry has a high ratio of premium-card holders: About 20% to 25% of credit cards issued in Israel are "Gold" credit cards ("Inflation in Gold Cards", Globes, May 6, 1997; "The Battle of Plastic Cards", Banka'ut, Volume 9, September 1996). A high ratio of gold cards may be partially attributed to greater certainty of evaluating the financial ability of the consumer. Of course, it could be attributed to other causes as well; for example, the close connection between the banking and credit card industries may make the issuing of gold credit cards a 'perk' to reward and strengthen the banking relationship.
create another credit card company. During that time, credit cards became one of the banks' most profitable operations. Allegedly, while some retailers, such as gas stations, were charged (quite uniform) fees of around 0.8%, coffee shops and other small businesses were charged fees as high as 5%.
ICC and Isracard responded that identical prices were a sign of competition pushing fees
down to (what turned to be similar) costs, that reports of high merchant fees were exaggerated, that the average merchant fee has gone down dramatically in the past few years 70 , and that that rate is lower than most other countries.
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After an investigation of the industry, the IAA sent ICC and Isracard letters, informing them of its intent to declare both of them as a "concentration group", which would create a presumption that both were monopolies for the purposes of the Restrictive Business Before either antitrust enforcement actions or legislative intervention was completed, however, the market created a third reaction to the lack of competition in the industry: and then to shekels again (to bill the consumer and pay the merchant). This double conversion causes the amount billed and paid to be different from the amount agreed upon between in the base transaction (since currency rates fluctuate over time and conversions back and forth are done at different times, and since there is a difference between the 'buy' and 'sell' currency rates, both used in the double conversion).
For example, Consumer, who was issued a Visa card by Alpha Card, buys a fancy pen from merchant for 100 new Israeli shekels, paying with his card. The merchant's acquirer is ICC. The merchant will present the transaction documentation to ICC, which, since it lacks a domestic agreement with Alpha Card, will present the documentation to Visa
International for settlement (just as it would if Consumer was an American tourist using, say, a Citibank Visa card). Visa International will immediately convert the transaction value to the settlement currency, which is likely to be U.S. dollars. Suppose the Shekel/Dollar sell rate (that is, the rate for selling Shekels, which is what converting shekels to dollars actually is) is on that day 2 shekels per dollar. Visa International will bill Alpha Card for $50 and will transfer the same amount to ICC. Alpha Card bills its cardholders in shekels, so it must reconvert the $50 charge. Suppose that is done three days later. The Shekel/Dollar buy rate (that is, the rate for buying shekels, which amounts to converting dollars to shekels) is 2.5 shekels per dollar. The consumer is therefore charged 125 shekels.
It is easy to anticipate the dissatisfaction of the parties to the base transaction, to find they are billed and paid based on a different transaction price (or at lease the dissatisfaction of the party that ends up on the short side of the reconversion).
The credit card companies could recalculate and reimburse the difference from their own pockets, but it is costly to identify the intra-national transactions from all the transactions processed through Visa International, then find the time the transaction was converted to dollars, find the rate used for the conversion, and convert back at that rate, getting the original base transaction price. Also, the company loses money through these reimbursements. Another option would be to reach an agreement between the domestic companies to provide the needed information or to reimburse each other's payments to consumers. That is, in fact, is the basis of a domestic agreement. But once such an agreement exists, it makes far more sense to short circuit Visa International and settle all charges in shekels in the first place.
A second disadvantage of settling through Visa International is that it does not have any information as to either the terms of the base transaction (except for the price) or of the terms of issuing the credit card involved in the transaction (such as grace periods).
Adding such data would make the settlement of numerous transactions between so many different credit card companies very complex, and so encumber the settlement system.
But without that data, Visa International is forced to settle immediately, causing the consumer to be billed immediately. It also disregards (out of ignorance) any credit or other benefits the merchant might have agreed to give the consumer.
So, in our previous example, suppose that when Consumer bought the fancy pen, he agreed with the merchant that he would pay for it in three monthly installments, with no interest charged. Suppose also that regardless of these terms, Alpha Card bills the consumer once a month, on the second day of that month, and that consumer bought the pen on the third day of the month, expecting to have a grace period of one month before the first installment is charged.
When Visa International processes Consumer's transaction, it is not aware of all those terms. It processes the transaction immediately, and Alpha Card can't tell that transaction from the many others it deals with, so it charges Consumer immediately. Three days after consumer became the happy owner of the fancy pen, he finds (if he was diligent enough to check) that though according to the base transaction he should have paid 34 shekels a month from now, another 33 shekels a month later and then another 33 another month later -he was charged 125 shekels immediately.
Again, Alpha card may either attempt to identify and reimburse or reinstate the terms of the original base transaction, but again, this may prove far more costly that creating a separate settlement mechanism with ICC through a domestic agreement.
Domestic agreements, as we have seen, lower the costs of interconnection and therefore make the different systems more compatible, enhancing the network externalities. But the benefits of that may not be distributed evenly -a larger system confers more value to a small system it interconnects with, than the value it receives from interconnecting to the smaller system. A mirror image of that is that the larger system isn't harmed as much by denying interconnection than the smaller system is. Many might abandon Alpha Card just to reduce the chance they encounter that problem.
The greater the costs of cross-company transactions (i.e., the lesser the compatibility between the systems), the more likely it is that we will see the market 'tip', as merchants and cardholders abandoning Alpha Card make the disadvantage even greater for those remaining in the shrinking network.
This may explain why ICC could have an incentive for 'foot dragging' as it negotiates a domestic agreement with Alpha Card. It also gives rise to an argument calling for government intervention in facilitating the agreement, either to prevent the market from tipping (if the new, smaller competitor had begun to operate) or to enable the entry of the new competitor (if it finds it impractical to enter without a domestic agreement).
Before discussing the main issues in the domestic agreement, we will examine the legal framework for regulatory intervention, and various possible paths the regulator could have taken in our case. We will then proceed to examine the path taken. Israeli law followed EU competition law in finding that, while being a monopolist is not an antitrust violation, abuse of dominant position is. 82 Abuse of dominant position does not require as much as does monopolization. 83 Further, Section 30 of the RBPA (as amended in 1998) authorizes the Antitrust Commissioner to issue to a monopolist orders deemed necessary to prevent it from harming competition. 84 Such orders may be issued is harm is expected to follow from a monopolist's conduct (which may also be a Section 29A abuse of dominant position), but also is harm was actually caused by a monopolist's existence. 85 The latter option has been introduced in the 1998 amendment, and its scope has yet to be defined. It is, most likely, broad enough to put antitrust regulation on equal 80 Picker, supra note 2, at pp. 84 The orders are subject to de novo judicial review. 85 The amended Section 30 is considered a less restrictive alternative to Section 31, which allows a court to order the break up of a monopoly, if its existence harms the public substantially, and (it is explicitly mentioned) there is no way to eliminate the harm through issuing orders under Section 30.
Regulatory Intervention in Facilitating Competition
footing with substantial regulation regarding the ability to address permanent competitive harms flowing from the existence of a monopoly.
We will now follow some of the antitrust issues that open might justify government intervention in the credit card industry. position', which is defined broadly and inexactly, the RBPA uses a mechanical test of market share -a firm is deemed to be a monopoly if it has a market share of above 50%
of a properly defined market, and is not a monopoly if it does not reach that share. 86 This analysis does not expressly consider barriers to entry, but these may have much relevance in identifying the relevant market.
Off the bat, one can think of three possible market definitions that would include ICC.
The first, and broadest, is that of all payment systems. The second is that of credit card payment systems. The third is the specific network in which ICC operates -the Visa network. Geographically, the proper definition would include the entire state of Israel, but would not extend further, since (as we saw) international credit card transactions, while possible, are more costly and cumbersome than domestic transactions. The business operation patterns also support that assessment, as most credit card companies operate within national borders.
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The issue of the proper market definition has been regarded by American courts: In NaBanco 88 , the appellants claimed the credit card industry should be divided into three separate markets: That of issuing, that of merchant servicing, and that of interchange 86 There is a procedure for setting a lower threshold than 50%, but this procedure was only attempted once, and failed that time. As we mentioned before and will regard again below, a firm may be regarded as a monopolist even if its market share is below 50%, if it is part of a 'concentration group' with a combined market share of above 50%. 87 There is a growing trend of globalization of payment systems, but that trend is still in its infancy. Another approach may also be taken if we accept a narrower market definition. A market definition of a single credit card network does not make sense in the U.S. market structure, but may accurately portray the market power in the Israeli market before Alpha
Card's entry. Since few Israelis had been issued credit card by both networks, most consumers were effectively locked in to the credit card of the network owned by the bank in which they had their active account. These locked-in customers were divided roughly evenly between ICC and Isracard.
Therefore, a merchant who wished to discontinue its membership with one of the networks, or not to join the network in the first place, lost its ability to do transactions by credit card with approximately half of his customers. It was unreasonable to believe that these customers will replace their credit card with one of a competing network, even if a significant number of businesses stopped accepting their credit card, since changing a credit card meant changing the bank with which they held their active account (and such change entails significant costs, such as reputation built over time and convenience).
Knowing that, credit card companies had little incentive to compete by cutting prices.
Each was, one may claim, well protected in its own separate market by the high costs of changing a bank that were required to change a credit card.
If that is a correct assessment of the market realities, then it may be proper, in these circumstances, to define the market very narrowly to a single credit card network (or, alternatively, to all the credit card networks owned by the same bank or group of banks.
Under this definition, both ICC and Isracard had market shares of 100%.
Again, delving into the question of applying Chapter D would be unnecessary, as the IAA chose instead to intervene through Chapter B -that deals with restraints of trade -to facilitate Alpha Card's entry. which at least one of the parties limits itself in a manner that could prevent or diminish competition between it and other parties to the agreement or between it and a third party.
Note that an agreement is a restraint of trade if it limits competition between two persons, even if this limitation actually helps overall competition in the market (or, as is the more common case, does not affect overall competition in the market). Thus, if two small groceries, surrounded by another hundred competitors, agree to a joint venture that will diminish competition between them, they will be considered parties to a restraint of trade.
Further, Section 2 continues to create cases of 'per se' restraints of trade (which are not necessarily per se illegal, since they may be approved), for agreements that regard the price of a product, the profit made, a division of the market, or the quantity, quantity or type of products or assets in the business.
A restraint of trade may be approved by the antitrust tribunal under Section 9 if the tribunal finds the agreement in the public interest. A restraint of trade may also be approved by the Antitrust Commissioner 93 (in a shorter, administrative procedure) under section 14, if the agreement affects harms competition only insignificantly. 94 Both tribunal and commissioner are allowed to condition their approval.
Under the broad definitions above, any interconnection agreement will be considered a restraint of trade, as it coordinated the very heart of the business of both parties to the 93 Formally, the Commissioner may exempt parties from the need to request the tribunal's approval, so the Commissioner's action is an exemption, not an approval. Substantively, there is no difference between the two actions. The difference between both procedures is in the narrower circumstances in which the Commissioner is allowed to exempt. 94 An amendment to the RBPA from this year (2000) broadened the Antitrust Commissioner's authority to approve restraints of trade, to include all non-naked restraints which either do not limit a significant share of the market or that do not significantly harm competition in the market. The amendment also authorized the Antitrust Commissioner to issue block exemptions, as does the EU commission under section 81(3) of the Treaty of Rome.
agreement. Indeed, the parties to the agreement filed a petition with the IAA to receive an exemption (approval) for the agreement under section 14 of the RBPA.
Harm to competition may be negligible (in fact, competition will be enhanced) if the interconnection agreement enables a new firm to enter the network on equal footing. But the agreement could be used to harm competition as well, by facilitating collusion between the competitors, or by coercing the entrant into a position in which it cannot effectively compete (thus both eliminating the threat of from the entrant and providing a warning for future entrants).
Therefore, the Antitrust Commissioner had the authority to exempt the agreement, under conditions that would ensure the agreement would serve proper pro-competitive ends.
That was the path taken; on July 7, 1988, after lengthy negotiations, an interconnection agreement was signed between ICC, Alpha Card, and their owners, and an exemption to that agreement was granted by the Antitrust Commissioner for a period of four years, 95 subject to detailed conditions.
We will now focus on the main issues in the interconnection agreement and the conditions to its exemption. cardholders by membership fees, issuing fees, etc.). For the acquirer -this is a significant expense.
Key Issues in an Interchange
But interchange fees have an even greater role in affecting competition, since they create a floor for the merchant fee rate charged by the acquirer. In any transaction in which the acquirer is not also the issuer, the acquirer must pay the issuer the interchange rate. If the merchant fee is priced below the interchange fee, not only doesn't the acquirer recover its cost and make a profit, but it actually receives negative revenues. Therefore, a prudent acquirer will rarely, if ever, set its merchant fee lower than the interchange fee plus a charge to cover its expenses.
The parties have different interests regarding the height of rates. Since the incumbent begins by controlling all or most merchants, it would prefer a high interchange fee, which would facilitate a high merchant fee and hinder attempts of price competition by the entrant. The entrant, on the other hand, would like to keep interchange fees low (possibly, for an initial period, below cost) in order to capture a significant market share through aggressive price competition. Acquiescing to a high interchange, high merchant fee system before it gathers a significant share would minimize its long run profits, and, if it does not manage to capture a market share sufficiently above the minimum efficient scale-the entrant would be eventually driven out of the market.
Not only the average rate, but also the structure of all the interchange rates, affect the industry's structure and may be of competitive concern. Since they are significant to the credit card companies' income, the structure of interchange fee rates gives important incentives to the companies. Unlike the example given in the beginning of this paper, interchange fees are rarely set at a single rate for all transactions.
Prior to Alpha card's entry, merchant fees varied widely based on the merchant's type of business. Indeed, there is some sense in varying the fee according to the industry involved. Some of the costs of credit card system operation are costs of fraud and default.
The risk of these is smaller when transactions are many and small, than when they are few and of high value. Therefore, a business characterized by many small purchases, such as a gas station, would be relatively safer, hence less costly, to service than an industry with few expensive purchases, such as a jewelry store.
But the variance of fee rates was far wider than the estimated risk difference could be, and the industry groupings did not seem to indicate that pattern. For example, a supermarket and small grocery stores (and, in fact, restaurants as well) are characterized by many small transactions. Yet supermarket chains were charged very low fees, well below 1%, while grocery stores were charged significantly higher fees, and restaurants were among the businesses charged the highest fees, sometimes as high as 4% (and some claim even higher rates).
A pattern of very low rates for gas and supermarket chains, relatively low rates for utilities and government, and very high rates for small businesses, may indicate a strategy of pricing low for businesses that might find it profitable otherwise to create their own retail cards. A gas chain offers many locations in which a consumer can use the card, therefore making the card attractive. On the other hand, a restaurant has a single location, and it is common to vary restaurants, and not to return constantly to the same one.
Therefore, a retail card from a restaurant is of relatively less value.
Consequently, a possible explanation for the rate structure of the merchant fees (with a single firm in the market, interchange fees were meaningless) is an attempt to 'limit price' to those industries that would otherwise create competing payment card systems. 97 ' 98 It is likely that the incumbent, wanting to cause minimal disruption to its current merchant fee rates, would structure the interchange fees in the same way -setting rates to different businesses at the same ratios as were the merchant fees. Since, as we discussed above, interchange fees are floors to the merchant fees, such an interchange fee structure 97 In a sense, the incumbent credit card company was 'Ramsey pricing', since it charged less from merchants that had more flexible demand. If pricing had been set below cost, this would be inefficient, though, as it would give the merchants the wrong price signal, and prevent efficient introduction of retail cards. 98 One of the rate structures that would price according to risk would be setting the interchange fee depending on the method of transacting: paper transactions without on-line approval are more susceptible to fraud, and should be charged a higher rate than transactions certified on-line with the issuer. might prevent 'cream skimming', and be the backbone that supports the old merchant fee structure even after competition precluded unilateral setting of such fees.
In the long run, the entrant has the same incentive as the incumbent in preventing competition from retail cards. However, the point we discussed about average rate levels holds true for rate structure as well -in the short term the incumbent wants to capture market share by 'cream skimming' -offering businesses that are on the subsidizing side of the cross-subsidies service for a price close to cost. An interchange fee of the sort discussed would frustrate such cream skimming.
The compromise reached by ICC, Alpha Card and the IAA distinguished between three periods, and created a mechanism for determining the rates in each period. During the first period, Visa International would conduct a cost study to ascertain the costs involved in issuing and acquiring in the Israeli market, and would recommend interchange fee rates and rate structures. Visa International's recommendations would become effective only upon the approval of the Antitrust Commissioner.
In the first period, beginning on the day of Alpha Card's entry and ending when the cost study recommendations are approved, the parties would charge interchange fees based on the merchant's line of business, and that the fee rate would be such that the average merchant rate would be at the same level as it was just before the agreement. However, the cost study will determine a new average fee, and the parties will retroactively reimburse each other for the changes between the actual average fee used and the recommended average fee (by adjusting pro rata each of the rate categories by the proportion between the actual rate used and the recommended rate).
In the second period, beginning when the cost study is approved and ending 18 months later, the categories of rates will remain as they are, but the rates for each category will be determined by the cost study. The second period serves to allow the merchant fees to adjust, by changing the fees but not the fee groups.
After the second period, the interchange rates would be set as recommended in the cost study and approved, "based on categories as determined in the cost study". This is likely to be taken to mean categories substantially different from an industry-based classification that might reduce incentives to create retail card systems.
This arrangement enabled the initiation of competition, and resulted in reduced interchange fees that allowed for lower merchant fees. 99 However, structural changes that resulted from the interconnection agreement required subsequent modification of the arrangement. Also, the conditions prohibit acquirers from entering into exclusivity agreements or "loyalty rebates" (which have a similar effect, replacing legal constraints with financial incentives) with merchants. These restrictions facilitate easier switching between acquirers, and therefore prevent the incumbent from foreclosing the merchants. 101 Finally, the conditions include a framework for instating antitrust compliance programs and antitrust compliance officers in each of the parties to the agreement, in an effort to create accountability to antitrust responsibilities.
(c) Prevention of Degradation: Closely related to operational matters yet much harder to address in an interchange agreement is the issue of preventing degradation. Shortly after the interconnection agreement was completed and Alpha Card began operating, it experienced difficulties in its settlement of cross-firm transactions with ICC. According to Alpha Card's allegations, ICC processed the cross-firm transactions in a slow and error-prone manner. 102 Assuming these allegations were true, an ICC cardholder using her credit card at a store that worked with Alpha Card, and an Alpha Card cardholder using his credit card at a store that worked with ICC, were much more likely than average to discover errors in the transaction. Merchants in the same situations would suffer a delay in receiving payment for the purchases, while the transactions were processed or corrected. ICC claimed that any delays were non-intentional, and resulted from the added complexity of cross-company transaction settlement (which did not exist before, when the Visa network contained only one company. Alpha Card did not allege fraudi.e., that the errors were skewed in favor of ICC merchants or cardholders. Nonetheless, even if the errors and the sluggishness of transaction settlements affected cross-company transactions randomly, Alpha Card was disproportionately hurt. Since it had a much smaller share than ICC of both merchants and cardholders, more transactions of both its merchants and its cardholders were cross-company transactions. To illustrate, suppose that ICC had a market share of 95% of both merchants and cardholders. An ICC cardholder using her credit card at a store had a 95% probability that the merchant would also work with ICC (corresponding to ICC's market share), so there was only a 5%
probability that a transaction would be cross-company. An Alpha Card cardholder, on the other hand, had only a 5% probability that the merchant would work with Alpha Card (corresponding to Alpha Card's market share), so there was a 95% probability that the transaction would be cross-company. The same holds for merchants working with each credit card company. . 105 Like normal (supply-side) economies of scale, network effects (i.e., demand-side increasing return to scale) are usually reduced and might even reverse above a certain point. At a point, they may become "network defects" -a net disutility from an increase in the number or volume of users of the network good. Reasons for this reversal may include congestion on the network, or relative advantages of one system over another that have to be sacrificed to ensure compatibility. In addition, the connectivity that enables the flow of positive externalities also enables the flow of negative externalities. For example, a computer virus that exploits a loophole in Microsoft Outlook is much more dangerous when most people use that program (and therefore become infected and subsequently infect others). Similarly, the interaction between people that is the source of network benefits in a social network is also the channel by which communicable diseases spread; tighter social connectivity results in faster and more harmful communication of diseases. Indeed the recent SARS epidemic demonstrated the importance of quarantining (a social network's form of reduction in network connectivity will affect only 30% of her calls, those to non-Goliath customers. Therefore, Betty is likely to switch to Goliath. This is precisely the reason Goliath adopted a strategy of degradation. Though the quality of its service suffers from the degradation as 30% of the calls are of lower quality than before --it hurts the quality of the competitors' services much more as 70% of their calls are affected, in our example. The migration of customers to the larger network compensates it for the loss resulting from the reduced quality of its own service caused by the degradation. The exclusion sanction (indeed, all of the private legal system's sanctions) are not as effective to a firm that degrades connectivity. A degrading firm might not be intimidated by a threat of exclusion; in fact, it might welcome it. If it is interested in denying its rivals of its network effects, exclusion is precisely what it wants. In that case, the exclusion is more harmful to the other network members than it is to the excluded party 109 Because degradation is more feasibly the larger the degrading firm and the smaller the rivals, it is particularly likely to happen in markets that have been absolute monopolies and are now facing, for the first time, a second firm in the industry. Thus, the incumbent may actually have to form cross-company connections for the first time, and this effort might run into some technical difficulties. Identifying those unintentional difficulties from an intentional strategy of degradation is hard, if not impossible. 110 On the mechanisms private legal systems use to enforce norms see Aviram, supra note 105, at 1204-1211.
(that is the reason the excluded party wishes to degrade in the first place), and thus the private legal system's threat to exclude is not credible.
Despite this analysis, punishment by the private legal system in our present case study might not be so difficult: ICC may have an incentive to degrade against Alpha Card, but not against all the foreign Visa-brand companies. Losing all of its business with foreign Visa-brand companies is likely to impose a greater cost than the benefit that would amount from degrading against Alpha Card. Thus, a threat by Visa International to exclude a degrader from the Visa network is likely to deter ICC from degrading, unless it can do so undetected, or otherwise avoid punishment.
IV. Evolution of the Credit Card Industry after the Interconnection Agreement
ICC had much warning time of Alpha Card's entry, 111 and prepared to face the competition. 112 Once the agreement was singed and Alpha Card began operating, it cut merchant fees by about 20%, and cancelled cardholder annual fees on its cards. 113 It also offered very attractive interest rates on credit.
Bank Leumi reacted strongly, immediately matching Alpha Card's terms. 114 The third player in the Israeli credit card industry is Isracard. Though it did not split, change ownership or lose clients, it too faced a changing playing field. Isracard reached an understanding with the IAA to undertake operational restrictions similar to those required of the Visa members in the interconnection agreement, 127 and agreed to waive its exclusivity in issuing and acquiring MasterCard credit cards beginning July 1999. 128 Its exclusivity in the Isracard brand will be waived, unless by a prescribed date it or its owner, Bank Poalim will issue half a million Visa cards (making it a third significant competitor in the Visa network).
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The entry of competition into the Visa system destabilized the segregation between clients of each credit card brand. Once Alpha Card began to market its cards to Leumi and Discount clients (as well as to Poalim's clients), ICC found itself pressured to seek clients outside of its regular grazing area. Since there were not many FIBI clients to go after, Poalim's clients were a more attractive target. The changes in the credit card industry also made more consumers interested in holding a second credit card.
Therefore, Leumi began planning its entry into the MasterCard market, 130 and had recently joined the network. 131 ICC has applied to join the MasterCard network as well.
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Structural changes in the industry modified the firms' incentives regarding interchange fee structure, necessitating modification of that aspect of the agreement. First, the structural changes caused objective delays in implementing the arrangement. 133 Second, since the structural change resulted in greater similarity in the size of the two competing firms, it reduced the difference in the interests of the firms vis-à-vis the interchange fee pricing structure, but increased the discrepancy between their interest in setting a high floor to merchant fees and the IAA's interest in reducing the fees (and hence the cost to merchants of doing business with credit cards). However, a third effect of the structural changes was an increase in the importance of the interconnection agreement to the larger firm.
134
Therefore, the IAA no longer faced resistance from the larger firm in implementing the interconnection arrangement, and could focus on ensuring a competition-enhancing interchange fee structure in that agreement.
Concerned with the interim fee structure becoming the de facto permanent structure, the IAA replaced the exemption to the interconnection agreement with a new and more limited exemption, which covers the determination of interchange fees only for a short period, forcing the parties to petition the Antitrust Tribunal for approval of the interconnection agreement. 135 This proceeding is currently litigated, and an agreement between the IAA and the credit card firm regarding the interim fees pending decision in 130 "Leumi in Advanced Negotiations with MasterCard to Issue a Card in Competition with Bank Ha'Poalim", Globes, November 11, 1998. 131 "The Powers Begin to Balance", Ha'Aretz. April 16, 2000. 132 Id. 133 The 1998 interconnection agreement and the IAA decision to exempt that agreement were made obsolete when (as described in Part IV below) one of the two firms failed and a new firm emerged. A new interconnection agreement was signed in 2000, requiring the IAA to modify the schedule of the interchange fee arrangement. 134 A market of similarly sized firms is likely to include more inter-firm transactions than a market with one very large player. Since the Israeli market shifted from the latter type of market to the former, inter-firm transactions became more common, and therefore the necessity of an interchange agreement more pressing even for the largest firm. 135 The proceeding at the Antitrust Tribunal is an alternative to the IAA's exemption. See supra, Part III(2)(c).
the proceedings 136 may indicate a likely shift from fee structures based on the type of merchant accepting payment with the card, to a structure based on the technology used to process the credit card transactions.
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As of early 2002, the Israeli Visa and MasterCard networks were on their way to becoming three-player fields, with Isracard, ICC and Leumi Card participating in both networks. The rapid changes of the industry frustrate any attempt to predict its future.
But while the tenant the IAA accommodated into the house of cards has passed away from exertion in fighting for a foothold, it seems Alice was right -there was PLENTY of room!
